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District Judge: Honorable Renee M. Bumb 
_____________ 
Argued: May 19, 2015 
Before: FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR., and SLOVITER, 
Circuit Judges 
(Opinion Filed: August 26, 2015) 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
The regulations implementing the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 
U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., provide that when a plan administrator 
denies a request for benefits, it must set forth a “description 
of the plan’s review procedures and the time limits applicable 
to such procedures, including a statement of the claimant’s 
right to bring a civil action.”  29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-
1(g)(1)(iv).  The ERISA plan at issue in this case contains a 
one-year deadline for filing a civil action.  Appellant Dr. 
Neville Mirza received a benefits denial letter advising him of 
his right to judicial review, but it did not mention the time 
limit for doing so.  The principal question we address is 
whether plan administrators must inform claimants, of plan-
imposed deadlines for judicial review, in their notifications 
denying benefits.  We hold that they must, and that the 
appropriate remedy for this regulatory violation is to set aside 
the plan’s time limit and apply the limitations period from the 
most analogous state-law cause of action—here, New 
Jersey’s six-year deadline for breach of contract claims.  
Because Mirza filed his complaint before the expiration of 
this six-year limitations period, we vacate and remand for 
further proceedings.  
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I. 
 
 “N.G.” is an employee of The Challenge Printing 
Company of the Carolinas (“Challenge”) and a participant in 
her employer’s ERISA plan.  The plan documents contain a 
section on claims procedures, which provides a framework 
for the submission and review of claims for benefits.  If a 
claimant receives an adverse initial benefit decision, she may 
appeal that determination through an internal review process.  
Once the claimant exhausts that process and receives a final 
decision from the plan administrator, the claimant has one 
year to bring a legal action for benefits.   
 
 In April 2010, N.G. consulted with Dr. Neville Mirza 
about severe back pain she was experiencing.  Mirza 
diagnosed N.G. with a herniated disc and recommended she 
undergo an endoscopic discectomy.  N.G. agreed to the 
proposed treatment plan and executed an assignment of 
benefits form that assigned to Mirza “any and all rights that 
[N.G.] may have including but not limited to [her] [personal 
injury protection] carrier for any payment of outstanding 
medical bills incurred with [Mirza].”  App. 174.  The parties 
agree that through this assignment Mirza stepped into the 
shoes of N.G. for purposes of pursuing any rights the latter 
might have under ERISA.  Mirza performed the procedure on 
N.G.’s back and submitted a claim for $34,500 to Insurance 
Administrator of America (“Insurance Administrator”), the 
company charged with processing claims under Challenge’s 
ERISA plan.   
 
 Insurance Administrator first denied the claim on June 
2, 2010, explaining that supporting documentation was 
missing.  Mirza submitted additional documents in response 
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to this denial, but the claim was denied again.  Mirza worked 
his way through the internal review process and, on August 
12, 2010, he received a letter denying his final appeal.  
Insurance Administrator found that the medical procedure on 
N.G.’s back was not a covered benefit because it was 
medically investigational.  At the end of the letter, Insurance 
Administrator informed Mirza of his “right to bring a civil 
action under ERISA § 502(a)” if he was not content with this 
final decision.1  App. 233.  Neither the August 12 letter nor 
any of the earlier denials mentioned that, under the plan, 
Mirza had one year from the date of the final benefits denial 
to seek judicial review.  At some point after Mirza received 
the August 12 letter, he retained the law firm of Callagy Law. 
 
  Around the same time that N.G. first visited Mirza in 
April 2010, she also met with Spine Orthopedics Sports 
(“Spine”).  N.G. likewise assigned her benefits to Spine, 
which, after providing anesthesia services to N.G., submitted 
a claim to Insurance Administrator for benefits under the 
ERISA plan.  After Insurance Administrator made only 
partial payment on the claim, Spine, like Mirza, retained 
Callagy Law to represent it in the benefits dispute.  On 
November 23, 2010, an employee from Insurance 
Administrator spoke on the telephone with someone from 
Callagy Law about Spine’s claim for benefits.  It is not clear 
what was said on this phone call.  According to Insurance 
Administrator, its employee read verbatim the plan language 
about the one-year deadline for filing suit following the final 
denial of benefits.  By Callagy Law’s account, the employee 
from Insurance Administrator said only that “a patient self-
                                              
1 Section 502(a) is codified in 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). 
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funded plan allows 12 months to appeal.”  App. 176 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Several months later, an attorney 
from Callagy Law, in connection with its representation of 
Spine, requested a copy of the ERISA plan documents, which 
included the time limit for judicial review.  Callagy Law 
received the plan documents on April 11, 2011.  While the 
parties debate the substance of the November 23, 2010 phone 
call, it is undisputed that the first time either Mirza or Callagy 
Law received written notice of the one-year deadline was on 
April 11, 2011.  
 
 On March 8, 2012—almost 19 months after he 
received the August 12, 2010 denial letter—Mirza sued 
Insurance Administrator for unpaid benefits.2  Mirza 
thereafter filed an amended complaint, this time against both 
Insurance Administrator and Challenge (collectively, 
“Defendants”), asserting breach of contract (Count One), and 
claims under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) for violating ERISA by 
improperly denying benefits (Count Two) and for an 
administrator’s failure to supply requested information 
(Count Three).  The District Court granted Defendants’ 
motion to dismiss as to Counts One and Three—neither of 
which is the subject of this appeal—and denied it as to Count 
Two.  With respect to Count Two, the District Court directed 
the parties to exchange information on the issue of whether 
the claim was time-barred in light of the plan’s one-year 
limitations period.  Following limited discovery, the District 
Court converted the motion to dismiss into one for summary 
judgment and ruled for Defendants. 
 
                                              
2 Spine is not a party to this litigation. 
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 The District Court disposed of Mirza’s claim for 
benefits through a three-step analysis.  First, it held the plan’s 
one-year deadline for seeking judicial review was enforceable 
because it was not unreasonable.  Next, it observed that, 
absent equitable tolling, Mirza’s suit was time-barred because 
it was filed more than one year after the final denial of 
benefits.  Finally, the District Court found Mirza was not 
entitled to equitable tolling because he had notice of the one-
year deadline for suing Defendants.  Recognizing there was 
no evidence that Mirza himself was aware of the deadline, the 
District Court imputed Callagy Law’s knowledge to Mirza.  
In its view, “[Mirza], through his counsel, was on notice of 
the time limit well in advance of the August 12, 2011 statute 
of limitations end date.  [Mirza’s] counsel was notified of the 
time limit orally on November 23, 2010 and received a copy 
of the plan on April 11, 2011 in connection with the Spine 
appeal, which dealt with the same patient—N.G.—and same 
plan.”  Mirza v. Ins. Adm’r of Am., Inc., No. 12-7370, 2013 
WL 5642587, at *5 (D.N.J. July 19, 2013).  Because it held 
Mirza had notice of the contractual time limitation, the 
District Court said it did not need to address Mirza’s 
argument that Defendants violated ERISA by not specifically 
informing him of the one-year deadline in the August 12 
denial letter.3 
                                              
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 
and 1367, and we have jurisdiction to review the District 
Court’s final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment and will affirm only if, “viewing the underlying 
facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion, we conclude that 
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II. 
 
 Our approach to this case proceeds along a different 
path from that taken by the District Court because we do not 
find equitable tolling to be an obstacle, or even relevant, to 
Mirza’s claim.  Instead, we focus our analysis on the issue the 
District Court avoided, namely, whether Defendants violated 
their regulatory obligations by failing to include the plan-
imposed one-year time limit for seeking judicial review in the 
letter denying Mirza’s request for benefits.4  We do so 
because that issue—and not equitable tolling—controls. 
 ERISA provides that a participant or beneficiary may 
bring a civil action “to recover benefits due to him under the 
terms of his plan.”  29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).  The statute, 
however, does not prescribe any limitations period for filing 
such an action.  When a statute does not provide a limitations 
period for filing a claim, we borrow the statute of limitations 
from the most analogous state-law claim, which in this case is 
breach of contract.  See Hahnemann Univ. Hosp. v. All Shore, 
                                                                                                     
a reasonable jury could not rule for the nonmoving party.”  
E.E.O.C. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 778 F.3d 444, 448 (3d Cir. 
2015) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
4 We see no reason to remand to the District Court to decide 
this issue in the first instance.  It is “generally appropriate” 
for an appellate court to reach the merits of an issue not 
decided by the district court if “the factual record is 
developed and the issues provide purely legal questions, upon 
which an appellate court exercises plenary review.”  Hudson 
United Bank v. LiTenda Mortg. Corp., 142 F.3d 151, 159 (3d 
Cir. 1998). 
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Inc., 514 F.3d 300, 305-06 (3d Cir. 2008).  The parties agree 
the default limitations period for Mirza’s claim is six years, 
which is the deadline for filing a breach of contract action 
under New Jersey law.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-1.  
However, because an ERISA plan is nothing more than a 
contract, parties may agree to a shorter limitations period so 
long as the contractual period is not unreasonable.  See 
Hahnemann Univ., 514 F.3d at 306. 
 
 The ERISA plan here provides that “no legal action 
may be commenced or maintained to recover benefits under 
the Plan more than 12 months after the final review/appeal 
decision by the Plan Administrator has been rendered.”  App. 
155.  Mirza’s suit is facially time-barred because he received 
the final denial letter on August 12, 2010, but he did not file 
suit until March 8, 2012.  Mirza’s pursuit of benefits is 
therefore doomed unless he can persuade us of a reason to toll 
or set aside the plan’s contractual deadline.  To that end, 
Mirza does not claim on appeal that the one-year deadline is 
unreasonably short.  Instead, he first argues that equitable 
tolling is warranted because he had no actual notice of the 
one-year deadline for suing Defendants.  Mirza points out that 
the only supposed evidence of notice is that his retained law 
firm, Callagy Law, in connection with representing another 
client, Spine, was informed of the contractual limitation on a 
phone call and received a copy of the plan documents.  In 
those circumstances, Mirza maintains, we cannot attribute 
Callagy Law’s knowledge to him.  Second, Mirza urges us to 
either equitably toll or set aside the one-year deadline for 
filing suit because Insurance Administrator was required to, 
but did not, inform him of the time limit for judicial review in 
its adverse benefit determination.  We discuss the second 
argument first. 
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A. 
 
 ERISA tasks the Secretary of Labor with promulgating 
regulations governing the claims procedure process.  29 
U.S.C. § 1133.  Exercising that authority, the Department of 
Labor issued extensive regulations setting forth the minimum 
requirements for plan procedures pertaining to claims for 
benefits.  See generally 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1.  One 
subsection of those regulations is at the core of this case.   
 
 Subsection (g), titled “[m]anner and content of 
notification of benefit determination,” provides that the plan 
administrator shall provide a claimant with written 
notification of any adverse benefit determination.  Id. 
§ 2560.503-1(g)(1).  And in those written notifications, the 
administrator shall set forth a “description of the plan’s 
review procedures and the time limits applicable to such 
procedures, including a statement of the claimant’s right to 
bring a civil action under section 502(a) of the Act following 
an adverse benefit determination.”  Id. § 2560.503-
1(g)(1)(iv).  We must decide whether this regulation requires 
plan administrators to inform claimants of plan-imposed time 
limits for bringing civil actions in their adverse benefit 
determinations.  If it does, Defendants violated this provision 
by not including the plan deadline in the August 12, 2010 
letter denying Mirza’s benefits. 
 
 As with any exercise in statutory interpretation, we 
begin with the text.  The parties, of course, offer competing 
visions of what this regulation mandates.  A claimant’s “right 
to bring a civil action,” Mirza says, is one of the “review 
procedures” for which “time limits” must be disclosed.  
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Defendants respond that § 2560.503-1(g)(1)(iv) refers to two 
distinct requirements.  The first requirement is based on the 
text that precedes the comma (i.e., notice of the plan’s review 
procedures and applicable time limits for those procedures), 
and the second is based on the text that follows (i.e., notice of 
the right to sue).  In other words, Defendants take the position 
that the notice of the right to sue is in addition to and entirely 
separate from the notice of the plan’s review procedures.  As 
one district court put it, “[t]hat the regulation requires 
notification of time limits for plan review procedures but says 
nothing about time limits with respect to civil actions 
suggests that the [Department of Labor] did not intend to 
require such a time limit notification in the benefit 
determination.”  Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. 
Co., No. 10-1813, 2012 WL 171325, at *6 (D. Conn. Jan. 20, 
2012), aff’d, 496 F. App’x 129 (2d Cir. 2012), aff’d, 134 S. 
Ct. 604 (2013).  This makes sense, Defendants believe, 
because a civil action seeking remedies under the plan is a 
separate review process from those contemplated by the 
internal claims proceedings.  
 
 We disagree with Defendants’ view and find the plain 
language of the regulation supports Mirza’s construction.  For 
purposes of interpretation, the most important word in the 
sentence is “including.”  “[I]ncluding” modifies the word 
“description,” which is followed by a prepositional phrase 
explaining what must be described—the plan’s review 
procedures and applicable time limits for those procedures.  If 
the description of the review procedures must “includ[e]” a 
statement concerning civil actions, then civil actions are 
logically one of the review procedures envisioned by the 
Department of Labor.  And as with any other review 
 12 
 
procedure, the administrator must disclose the plan’s 
applicable time limits.   
 
 Defendants’ arguments to the contrary fail to explain 
how the clause regarding the right to sue fits within the 
structure of the sentence.  The argument that the language 
speaks to time limits for plan procedures but is silent as to 
time limits for civil actions reads the word “including” out of 
the regulation.  It also assumes, without explanation, that civil 
actions cannot be considered plan review procedures.  But 
that interpretation contravenes the text of the regulation.  In 
any case, to the extent § 2560.503-1(g)(1)(iv) is ambiguous, 
we construe it broadly and in favor of Mirza because ERISA 
is a remedial statute.  See Brown v. J.B. Hunt Transp. Servs., 
Inc., 586 F.3d 1079, 1086 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 
 Both Courts of Appeals that have addressed this issue 
agree with our interpretation of the regulation.  See Moyer v. 
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 762 F.3d 503, 505 (6th Cir. 2014) (“We 
agree with [claimant] that on the date his revocation letter 
was sent, it was required to include the time limit for judicial 
review.”); id. (“The claimant’s right to bring a civil action is 
expressly included as a part of those procedures for which 
applicable time limits must be provided.”); Ortega 
Candelaria v. Orthobiologics LLC, 661 F.3d 675, 680 (1st 
Cir. 2011) (“[Defendant] was required by federal regulation 
to provide [plaintiff] with notice of his right to bring suit 
under ERISA, and the time frame for doing so, when it denied 
his request for benefits.”); id. at 680 n.7 (“We think it clear 
that the term ‘including’ indicates that an ERISA action is 
considered one of the ‘review procedures’ and thus notice of 
the time limit must be provided.”). 
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 Defendants direct us to two other cases from the 
Courts of Appeals.  See Scharff v. Raytheon Co. Short Term 
Disability Plan, 581 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 2009); Heimeshoff v. 
Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 496 F. App’x 129 (2d Cir. 
2012) (unpublished).  In Scharff, the benefits denial letter 
mentioned the claimant’s right to bring an ERISA action but 
did not reference the plan’s contractual one-year limitations 
period.  581 F.3d at 902-03.  When the plaintiff filed an 
untimely suit, she did not rely on § 2560.503-1(g)(1)(iv) to 
excuse delay.  Rather, she argued that, by failing to disclose 
the deadline, the defendant violated the “reasonable 
expectations doctrine,” which, the court explained, has been 
incorporated into ERISA federal common law.  Id. at 903-05.  
The court disagreed, and held that the defendant’s disclosures 
in other documents were sufficient.  Id. at 906.  Scharff is not 
helpful to Defendants here because it was decided under 
federal common law and the court did not even mention 
§ 2560.503-1(g)(1)(iv), much less interpret it.  Similarly, in 
Heimeshoff, an unpublished case, the Second Circuit also did 
not speak to the meaning of this provision.  496 F. App’x at 
130.  The plaintiff there urged the court to find that 
§ 2560.503-1(g)(1)(iv) requires the disclosure of time limits 
for civil actions.  But the court said it “need not address this 
issue” because the plaintiff had notice of the limitation and 
was therefore not entitled to equitable tolling.5  Id. at 130-31.   
 
                                              
5 For reasons explained below, we disagree with the finding 
in Heimeshoff that a claimant’s notice of the filing deadline 
can work to the benefit of a defendant who violates the terms 
of § 2560.503-1(g)(1)(iv). 
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 In addition to the regulatory text and the relevant 
decisions from the Courts of Appeals, practical considerations 
also support our interpretation of the regulation.  For starters, 
this case exemplifies how, were we to endorse Defendants’ 
position, plan administrators could easily hide the ball and 
obstruct access to the courts.  The ERISA plan at issue here is 
ninety-one pages.  The one-year time limit is buried on page 
seventy-three of the plan.  The August 12 letter denying 
Mirza’s final appeal is only five pages.  Which is a claimant 
more likely to read—a ninety-one page description of the 
entire plan or a five-page letter that just denied thousands of 
dollars in requested benefits?  Furthermore, by not creating a 
statute of limitations for ERISA actions brought under 29 
U.S.C. § 1132(a), Congress, in effect, delegated this authority 
to plan administrators and fiduciaries to come up with their 
own deadlines for judicial review.  Without the plan-imposed 
deadline here, we would have applied the New Jersey statute 
of limitations for breach of contract, and Mirza would have 
had six years to file suit.  The plan substantially narrowed that 
window, shortening the deadline from six years to one.  
While this was likely reasonable as a matter of contract law, 
the Department of Labor obviously thought it important to 
make sure claimants were aware of these substantially 
reduced limitations periods.  One very simple solution, which 
imposes a trivial burden on plan administrators, is to require 
them to inform claimants of deadlines for judicial review in 
the documents claimants are most likely to actually read—
adverse benefit determinations.  Section 2560.503-1(g)(1)(iv) 
does just that. 
 
 Defendants offer additional arguments against finding 
a regulatory violation.  They suggest that Mirza’s reading of 
the regulation would put plan administrators in the precarious 
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position of having to provide legal advice to plan participants.  
Defendants argue that, where an ERISA plan itself does not 
contain a limitations period, the administrators would have to 
research the applicable statute of limitations for judicial 
review, which may vary from state to state and claimant to 
claimant.  These are reasonable concerns, but our holding is 
narrower than that feared by Defendants.  We conclude only 
that § 2560.503-1(g)(1)(iv) requires written disclosure of 
plan-imposed time limits on the right to bring a civil action.  
We express no view on the applicability of this provision to 
ERISA plans that are silent as to limitations periods and thus 
borrow from analogous state-law claims. 
 
 Defendants argue that ERISA requires only substantial 
compliance, not strict compliance, and that, at most, any 
shortcoming in the denial letter was a technical violation of 
the regulations.  We acknowledge courts have found that, as 
Defendants observe, substantial compliance with ERISA’s 
notice requirements is all that is necessary.  See, e.g., 
Gagliano v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 547 F.3d 230, 
237 (4th Cir. 2008).  We agree with the Sixth Circuit in 
concluding that the “failure to include the judicial review time 
limits in the adverse benefit determination letter renders the 
letter not in substantial compliance with § 1133.”  Moyer, 762 
F.3d at 506.  One of the purposes of 29 U.S.C. § 1133, which 
is the statutory foundation for the regulations governing 
claims procedures, is to provide claimants with adequate 
information to ensure effective judicial review.  See id. at 
507; Brown, 586 F.3d at 1086.  The disclosure of a reduced 
time limitation in a denial letter ensures a fair opportunity to 
review by making it readily apparent to a claimant that he or 
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she may have only one year—or even much less than that6—
before the courthouse doors close. 
 
 Accordingly, we hold that 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-
1(g)(1)(iv) requires that adverse benefit determinations set 
forth any plan-imposed time limit for seeking judicial review.  
Without this time limit, a notification is not in substantial 
compliance with ERISA.  Defendants in this case violated 
this regulation by not including in the August 12, 2010 denial 
letter the plan’s one-year deadline for bringing a civil action. 
 
B. 
 
 According to Defendants, none of our analysis thus far 
matters.  They argue that regardless of whether there is a 
regulatory violation, there is no basis for equitably tolling the 
contractual limitation because Mirza was on notice of the 
one-year filing deadline.  The District Court agreed.  It found 
that Mirza’s law firm, Callagy Law, was informed of the time 
limit during a November 2010 phone call and received the 
plan documents with the deadline in April 2011.  Though 
Callagy Law acquired this information during its 
representation of another client (Spine), the District Court 
nonetheless imputed Callagy Law’s notice to Mirza. 
 
 Assuming Mirza was in fact on notice, Defendants’ 
argument is not without some support.  As mentioned earlier, 
the Second Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, concluded that 
                                              
6 See, e.g., Northlake Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Waffle House Sys. 
Emp. Benefit Plan, 160 F.3d 1301, 1304 (11th Cir. 1998) 
(finding ninety-day deadline reasonable). 
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a claimant’s delay in filing her ERISA suit could not be saved 
by the defendant’s alleged violation of § 2560.503-1(g)(1)(iv) 
because she conceded she had a copy of the plan that 
contained the three-year limitations provision.  See 
Heimeshoff, 496 F. App’x at 130-31.  Because she had actual 
notice, she was not entitled to equitable tolling.  Id. at 131-32.  
In addition, Defendants attempt to distinguish the two 
decisions from the Courts of Appeals finding that the 
disclosure of time limits is required by arguing that the 
claimants in those cases unambiguously did not have notice 
of the plan’s deadline.7  In those circumstances, Defendants 
say, it was appropriate to equitably toll the limitations period.  
By contrast, Mirza was on notice and there is no similar basis 
for excusing his untimely filing. 
 
 Though we have some doubt as to whether the District 
Court erred in finding Mirza on notice through his law firm,8 
we need not decide that issue.  In our view, the doctrine of 
equitable tolling should not bear on Mirza’s case.  If we 
                                              
7 Moyer, 762 F.3d at 505 (“Being unaware of the contractual 
time limit, [claimant] filed his complaint late.”); Ortega 
Candelaria, 661 F.3d at 681 (“It is uncontested that 
[defendant] never informed [claimant] of the one-year 
limitation.”).   
8 See Epright v. Envtl. Res. Mgmt., Inc. Health & Welfare 
Plan, 81 F.3d 335, 342 (3d Cir. 1996) (“The fact that 
[plaintiff’s] attorney had a copy of the plan, and thus the 
means to ascertain the proper steps for requesting review, in 
no way excuses [defendant’s] failure to comply with the 
Department of Labor’s regulations.”). 
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allowed plan administrators in these circumstances to respond 
to untimely suits by arguing that claimants were either on 
notice of the contractual deadline or otherwise failed to 
exercise reasonable diligence, plan administrators would have 
no reason at all to comply with their obligation to include 
contractual time limits for judicial review in benefit denial 
letters.  Instead, they could almost invariably argue that the 
contractual deadline was in the plan documents and that 
claimants are charged with knowledge of this fact.  But that 
approach would render hollow the important disclosure 
function of § 2560.503-1(g)(1)(iv).  As we mentioned earlier, 
we believe claimants are much more likely to read benefit 
denial letters than the voluminous descriptions of their entire 
ERISA plans. 
 
 The better course here is to set aside the plan’s one-
year deadline for filing suit.  We have previously found that 
“[w]hen a letter terminating or denying Plan benefits does not 
explain the proper steps for pursuing review of the 
termination or denial, the Plan’s time bar for such a review is 
not triggered.”  Epright, 81 F.3d at 342.9  Because the denial 
letter Mirza received on August 12, 2010 did not comply with 
the regulatory requirements, the one-year deadline for judicial 
                                              
9 See also Syed v. Hercules Inc., 214 F.3d 155, 162 (3d Cir. 
2000) (“Where a termination letter does not comply with the 
statutory and regulatory requirements, the time limits for 
bringing an administrative appeal are not enforced against the 
claimant.”); Burke v. Kodak Ret. Income Plan, 336 F.3d 103, 
107 (2d Cir. 2003) (same); White v. Jacobs Eng’g Grp. Long 
Term Disability Benefit Plan, 896 F.2d 344, 350 (9th Cir. 
1989) (same). 
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review was not triggered.  We will instead borrow the statute 
of limitations from the most analogous state-law claim, which 
the parties agree is New Jersey’s six-year deadline for breach 
of contract actions.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-1; 
Hahnemann Univ., 514 F.3d at 305-06.  Mirza filed his 
complaint on March 8, 2012, well before the six-year 
limitations period for breach of contract expired.  
Accordingly, the District Court erred by dismissing his suit as 
untimely. 
 
III. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the order of the 
District Court and remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
